Novi doktorski studij

Popularizacija fizike

Uredovno vrijeme

Uredovno vrijeme za studente je radnim danom od 12 do 14 sati. U navedenom vremenu vrata hodnika Odjela za fiziku (prizemlje i prvi kat) bit će otključana, dok ulaz na suteren studentima nije dozvoljen. 

Filozofija uma

Studij: Diplomski studij Fizika i filozofija
Godina: I.
Semestar: zimski
Broj sati u semestru (P+V+S): 30+0+30
Status predmeta: obvezatan
ECTS: 6

Opis predmeta:  .pdf

Izvedbeni program:  .pdf

Sadržaj
  • Uvod u intencionalnost
  • Naturalizacija intencionalnosti
  • Intencionalnost i inferencija
  • Intencionalnost i normativnost
  • Normativizam
  • "Uski" i "široki" mentalni sadržaj
  • Protiv širokog sadržaja
  • David Chalmersove dvije dimenzije sadržaja
  • Protiv  Chalmersove teorije sadržaja
  • Ne-konceptualni sadržaj
  • Protiv ne-konceptualnog sadržaja
  • Fenomenalni karakter i intencionalni sadržaj
  • Ne-intencionalni qualia
  • Ponavljanje


Obvezna literatura
Brandom, R. 2002. "Reasoning and representing." In D. Chalmers, ed. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 509-519.

Brentano, F. 2002. "The distinction between mental and physical phenomena." In D. Chalmers, ed. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 479-484.

Chalmers, D. 2002. "The components of content." In D. Chalmers, ed. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 608-633.

Dretske, F. 2002. "A recipe for thought." In D. Chalmers, ed. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 491-499.

Heck, R. G. 2007. "Are there different kinds of content?" In B. P. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, eds. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 117-138.

Millikan, R. 2002. "Biosemantics." In D. Chalmers, ed. Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 500-509.
 
Rey, G. 2007. "Resisting Normativism in Psychology." In B. P. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, eds. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 69-84.

Sawyer, S. 2007. "There is no viable notion of narrow content." In B. P. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, eds. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 20-34.
 
Segal, G. 2007. "Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitudes Attributions." In B. P. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, eds. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 5-19.

Shoemaker, S. 2007. "A case for qualia." In B. P. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, eds. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 318-332.

Tye, M. 2007. "New troubles for the qualia freak." In B. P. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, eds. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Blackwell, 303-318.

Wedgwood, R. 2007. "Normativism defended." In B. P. McLaughlin and J. Cohen, eds. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind . Oxford: Blackwell, 85-101.